WHEN A MAJORITY LOSES ON THE MERITS: MILLER V.
ALBRIGHTAND THE PROBLEM OF SPLINTERED JUDGMENTS
American citizenship is a highly valued possession.' In the early
decades of the republic, a combination of common law principles
and federal statutes specified the manner in which various individuals
I See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) ("American citizenship ...is 'one of the most valuable rights in the world today[.]'") (citations
omitted); CHARLES GORDON ETAL., IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE § 91.01 [1] (rev.
ed. 1998) ("Everyone agrees that U.S. citizenship is precious."); JUDITH N. SHKLAR,
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 4 (1991)

("[T]he possession of an

American passport ...is profoundly valued, especially by naturalized citizens. Few
indeed are the new American citizens who have chosen to throw their naturalization
papers away."). But see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALIrY OF CONSENT 33 (1975)
(arguing that "happily - the concept of citizenship plays only the most minimal role
in the American constitutional scheme.").
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) reports that, in a single oneyear period (1995-96), the number of naturalizations more than doubled - increasing to almost 1.045 million in 1996. See 1996 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 11 (DEP'T OFJUSTICE 1997). In addition to the

large numbers naturalized as citizens, 915,900 people were granted the status of
permanent resident alien in 1996. See id.
Above and beyond the value attached by so many to American citizenship, international law places great importance on the concept of citizenship generally and
limits a state's otherwise unrestricted power to grant or withdraw its nationality. See
Universal Declarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (3), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948) (providing that every person "has the right to a nationality[ I"
and that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality .... "); HANNAH
ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 293 (1966) ("The Rights of Man, supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable - even in countries whose constitutions were based upon them - whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any sovereign state."); Johannes M.M. Chan, The Right to a Nationality as a
Human Right, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 1-11 (1991) (examining the development of the
right to nationality); see also The Protocol to the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223 (furnishing limited protection to stateless
refugees); United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,
Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117; Convention on the Reduction of the Number of
Cases of Statelessness, Sept. 13, 1973, 1081 U.N.T.S. 283 (proscribing any denationalization that renders an individual stateless - excepting serious acts of disloyalty).
Although the United States is not a signatory to the latter two agreements, a
plurality of the United States Supreme Court has concluded that banishment violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. See Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958); cf. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958)
(Warren, C.J., dissenting) ("Citizenship is man's basic right for it is nothing less than
the right to have rights.").
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could acquire it.' With the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, people born in the United States became the first and only
class of individuals constitutionally entitled to citizenship.' All others
acquire citizenship, if at all, by the grace of the United States Congress - that is to say, by federal statute.'
Unavoidably, statutes admitting aliens or granting citizenship
require line-drawing. Congressional line-drawing in this area is tra2

See Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 103-04 (repealed 1795).

A pri-

mary goal of the law was to ensure American citizenship for children born overseas
to American citizens. See Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 661 (1927) (quoting 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 1121 (1790) (statement of Congressman Burke) ("The case of the
children of American parents born abroad ought to be provided for, as was done in
the case of English parents in the 12th year of William III.")); see also GORDON ET AL.,
supra note 1, § 91.02 [3] [b] (providing an overview of the historical development of
these statutory provisions).
Acquisition of U.S. citizenship, whether by birth or by naturalization, carries
with it a collection of rights and liabilities. See id. § 91.05. The rights enjoyed by
U.S. citizens include (1) the right to enter and stay in the United States, (2) the
right to leave the United States and travel or live abroad, (3) diplomatic protection
when problems are encountered abroad, (4) the statutory right to transmit citizenship to foreign-born children, and (5) political rights such as the right to vote and
the right to hold elected office. See id. The liabilities associated with U.S. citizenship
include (1) the obligation to pay taxes, (2) the obligation to obey the laws of the
United States, (3) susceptibility to extradition, and (4) the obligation, potentially, to
serve in the armed forces. See id.
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Prior to the enactment of the
Fourteenth
Amendment, people born in the United States became citizens under ancient common law principles. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
4 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("The Congress shall have Power ....
To establish an uniformRule of Naturalization ....
");see also 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1994); United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898) (There are "two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization.").
See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 795 n.6 (1977) ("In the inevitable process of
'line drawing,' Congress has determined that certain classes of aliens are more likely
than others to satisfy national objectives without undue cost, and it has granted preferential status only to those classes.") (emphasis added). See generally GEOFFREY R.
STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 564-67 (3d ed. 1996).

Stone explains the theo-

retical basis of equal protection methodology and notes that, in a sense, all laws
"classify" people. See generally id. For example, a simple speeding law places people
in two groups - those who speed and those who do not. The law establishes different consequences for the members of each group. Ordinarily, the principle of
equal protection is violated only when there is no rational basis for treating
"speeders" differently than "non-speeders." See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425-26 (1961) ("The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective.
State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality."). If a law draws
lines based on "suspect" criteria such as race, however, the equal protection principle is violated whenever the classification is not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest. See STONE ET AL., supra, at 601-08. A medium level of
scrutiny is applied to laws that draw lines based on "quasi-suspect" criteria such as
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ditionally entitled to tremendous judicial deference.6 In fact, in the
areas of immigration and naturalization, "Congress regularly makes
rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."' Nevertheless, in a recent case, five Justices of the Supreme Court agreed that it
is possible for federal citizenship laws to offend the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection.8 Ironically, however, the litigant
bringing the equal protection challenge, though able to persuade
three dissenters and two concurring Justices on the merits of her
claim, went home empty-handed.9
Strange outcomes such as this are possible only when the judgment of the Court is announced through fragmented concurring
opinions - each of which bases its vote as to who wins on differing
grounds.'0 Splintered judgments create problems, arguably, for any
legal system that operates according to principles of stare decisis." In
sex. SeeJOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 782 (5th ed.
1995).
Such laws must have a "substantial relationship to an important
[governmental] interest ..
" Id.
6 See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 n.21
(1976) ("[T]he power
over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial
review."); see also Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 ("This court has repeatedly emphasized that
'over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than
it is over' the admission of aliens.") (citations omitted); United States v. Ginsberg,
243 U.S. 472, 475 (1917) ("No alien has the slightest right to naturalization unless all
statutory requirements are complied with .... "); cf Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211
(1962) ("Not only does resolution of [foreign relations] issues frequently turn on
standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature; but many such questions
uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government's views.") (footnotes
omitted); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) ("The conduct of
the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative ... departments ..
").
7 Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,
80 (1976).
8 See Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1457-58
(1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("I also agree... that 'it is unlikely' that 'gender classifications based on stereotypes
can survive heightened scrutiny,' a view shared by at least five members of this
Court.") (citations omitted).
9 See id. at 1442 ("The judgment of the Court of Appeals
[denying the petitioner's relief] is affirmed.").
10 See infra notes 109-53 and accompanying text (discussing the differing
rationales of the opinions in Miller).
1 See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (stating that "a precedent
of this
Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the
judges of those courts may think it to be").
The importance of stare decisis is well settled. See Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) ("[I]t is indisputable that stare decisis is a basic selfgoverning principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive
and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not
based upon 'an arbitrary discretion."') (citations omitted); see also Welch v. Texas
Dep't of Highway and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987) ("[T]he doctrine of
stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law."); Ute Indian Tribe v.
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particular, lower courts are denied a clear and binding resolution of
the legal issues that had formed the basis of the appeal. 2 On the
other hand, every court's first responsibility is to adjudicate the legal
claims and defenses of the litigants before it; formulating rules for
the future is a power committed primarily to the political branches."3
In short, adjudication of individual controversies, without a clear
resolution of the substantive legal questions, brings into sharp focus a
tension between two different understandings of the Supreme
Court's primary role - one focused on the'' resolution of private disputes, the other on "saying what the law is. 1
Recently, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Albright, 5 in which Lorelyn Penero Miller lost her bid for American
citizenship.' This result followed Miller's unsuccessful challenge to
the distinction federal law makes between the foreign-born children
of unmarried-citizen mothers, who easily qualify for citizenship at
birth, and the foreign-born children of unmarried-citizen fathers,
who face more substantial obstacles. 7 Miller lost, even though a majority of the Justices apparently agreed that the sex-based distinction
could not withstand heightened scrutiny. 8
Utah, 935 F. Supp. 1473, 1509 (D. Utah 1996) ("[S]tare decisis, or the rule of precedent, represents [a] fundamental precept of common-law adjudication[.]").
12

SeeJAMEs WM. MOORE ET AL., 18 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.04 (3d ed.

1998) ("An affirmance by an equally divided court does not constitute a precedent.") (citing United States ex rel. Radich v. Criminal Court, 459 F.2d 745, 750 (2d
Cir. 1972).
1 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
(establishing that
judges may say "what the law is" only when deciding "particular cases"). Herbert
Wechsler stated this proposition brilliantly in an oft cited passage:
Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, do not pass on constitutional questions because there is a special function vested in them to
enforce the Constitution or police the other agencies of the government. They do so rather for the reason that they must decide a litigated issue that is otherwise within their jurisdiction and in doing so
must give effect to the supreme law of the land. That is, at least, what
Marbury v. Madison was all about. I have not heard that it has yet been
superceded, though I confess I read opinions on occasion that do not
exactly make its doctrine clear.
Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1006

(1965).
See infra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.

5 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998).

See id.at 1442.
See id. In order to transmit U.S. citizenship at birth to their foreign-born
offspring, unmarried-citizen mothers must satisfy the requirements of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409(c). See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1994). Unmarried-citizen fathers, by contrast,
must satisfy the more onerous requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a). See id. § 1409(a).
Is See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1457-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I also agree ... that 'it
is unlikely' that 'gender classifications based on stereotypes can survive heightened
16
17
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The petitioner was born in the Philippines on June 20, 1970.'9
Her father, Charlie Miller, was an American serviceman posted in the
Philippines at the time of her conception.20 Her mother, Luz PenIndeed, Loreero, a Philippine citizen, never married her father.'
lyn's birth records indicate that she was born illegitimate; her biological father's name and nationality were not listed.2
Miller grew up in the Philippines with her mother.23 Shortly after her twenty-first birthday, she applied to the United States State
Department in Manila for registration as an American citizen. 4 The
Department denied her request - citing her failure to satisfy the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) .25 After
scrutiny,' a view shared by at least five members of this Court.") (citations omitted).
19 See Brief for Petitioner at 4, Miller v. Albright, 118 S.Ct.
1428 (1998) (No. 961060).
20 See id.
21 See id.
See Miller v. Christopher, 870 F. Supp. 1, 1 (D.D.C. 1994). The name of the
case changed because Warren Christopher was the Secretary of State when the case
was initiated, and then Madeline Albright succeeded him.
2
See Miller, 118 S.Ct. at 1432. In fact, it is not clear whether she has ever lived
in the United States. See id. ("There is no evidence that either she or her mother
ever resided outside of the Philippines.").
24 See Brief for Respondent at 2, Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998)
(No.
96-1060).
25 See id. The Department
concluded:
[S]he had not established any formal legal and financial relationship
with her putative father either 'while [petitioner was] under the age of
twenty-one years by legitimation,' as required by former Section 309(a)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. [§1 1409(a)
(1982), or before she turned 18 under the legitimation-oracknowledgment provisions of the present Section 309(a).
Id.
Section 309(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409(a), provides:
§ 1409. Children born out of wedlock
(a) The provisions of paragraphs (c), (d), (e), and (g) of section
1401 of this title, and of paragraph (2) of section 1408 of this title,
shall apply as of the date of birth to a person born out of wedlock if(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is
established by clear and convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the
time of the person's birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support for the person until the person reaches
the age of 18 years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years (A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in
writing under oath, or
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procuring a paternity decree from a Texas judge, 6 Miller asked the
State Department to reconsider its denial of her application. 7
When the State Department again refused to grant her United
States citizenship, Miller and her father sued the Secretary of State in
federal district court."' The plaintiffs did not dispute Miller's failure
to satisfy the requirement's of the INA.29 Rather, they argued that
section 309(a)30 of the INA violates the Constitution's guarantee of
equal protection by illegally distinguishing between (1) illegitimate
and legitimate children, (2) illegitimate children of men and illegitimate children of women, and (3) male parents and female parents."'
The district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 2 Even if the challenged statute is unconstitutional,
Judge Lamberth reasoned, the court is powerless to grant the desired
remedy. 3 The Judge declared that only an affirmative act of Congress, can confer citizenship on those born abroad; if the statute is
invalidated, there is no such affirmative grant in existence.34 Absent
some redressable injury, the judge concluded, Miller lacked standing
to sue in federal court.35
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a competent court.
8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1994).
26 See Miller, 870 F. Supp. at 1 n.1.
The decree declared that Charlie R. Miller is
the biological father of Lorelyn Penero Miller. See id.
27 SeeMiller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467,
1469 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
28 See id. The case was originally filed in the United States
District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas. See id. The district court in Texas dismissed Charlie Miller
as a plaintiff for lack of standing. See id. With Miller's father out of the case, it was
then transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Colombia
where venue was proper. See id.
See Miller, 870 F. Supp. at 2.
30 See supra note 25 (quoting the text of § 309(a), which is codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1409(a) (1994)).
5, See Miller, 96 F.3d at 1469. Since the challenged law is a federal statute,
the
textual basis for the equal protection challenge is the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (holding that the
guarantee of equal protection contained in the Fourteenth Amendment is an essential component of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process).
32 See Miller, 870 F. Supp. at 3.
33 See id. (citing INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 884 (1988)
(stating that federal
courts lack discretion to grant citizenship in the absence of express statutory authority)).
34 See
id.
35 See id.
In reaching this conclusion, the judge reviewed the three essential
elements of constitutional standing. See id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). A party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court
must establish: (1) "an invasion of a legally protected interest" (2) "a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of" and (3) a likelihood that a
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The Court of Appeals partially addressed the merits of the case, 36
rejectingJudge Lamberth's conclusion that there is no injury capable
of redress in a federal court. 7 With respect to the statute's differential treatment of male versus female parents, however, the court held

favorable decision will redress the injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. The injury and
causation elements were not contested in this action. See Miller,870 F. Supp. at 3.
The Supreme Court's standing doctrine has been the subject of withering criticism on several fronts. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 775 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("With all due respect, the Court has either misread the complaint or
is improperly requiring the respondents to prove their case on the merits in order to
defeat a motion to dismiss."). Justice Brennan added: "More than one commentator has noted that the causation component of the Court's standing inquiry is no
more than a poor disguise for the Court's view of the merits of the underlying
claims. The Court today does nothing to avoid that criticism." Id. at 782 (footnote
omitted); see also Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 827 (1969) (arguing that, at the time of the Constitution's framing, several common legal practices encouraged strangers to attack unauthorized action); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of SelfGovernance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1395 (1988) (demonstrating that, until the twentieth century, courts did not treat standing as an Article III requirement, but rather
granted relief whenever plaintiffs asserted rights for which remedies were available
at law).
36 See Miller, 96 F.3d at 1472-73.
Before deciding the substantive legal question,
however, the court first determined the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the
statute. See id. at 1470-71. To find the appropriate standard, the court relied on
Congress's "plenary authority to prescribe rules for the admission and exclusion of
aliens .... " Id. at 1470 (citing Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)
("[T]he power to expel or exclude aliens [is] a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial
control.")). Judge Buckley concluded that the government need only demonstrate
"a facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for the statute's existence. Id. (quoting
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (applying the "facially legitimate
and bona fide reason" standard in the context of a First Amendment challenge to an
immigration law)). In applying the "facially legitimate" standard, the government is
not obliged to point to an explicit textual statement of the law's rationale. See id. at
1471 (citing Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 805 (9th Cir. 1995)).
37 See id. at 1470 ("Miller did not request
the court to grant her citizenship;
rather, she requested that the court declare section 1409(a) unconstitutional and
merely make a finding.., that she was a U.S. citizen from birth.") (emphasis
added). The court reasoned that in the event § 1409(a) is invalidated, a federal
court could make a finding of citizenship under § 1401(g). See id. That section essentially grants citizenship to any child born abroad to parents, at least one of whom
is an American citizen, provided certain residency requirements are satisfied. See 8
U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994).
Justice Scalia noted that in light of the separate requirements imposed by
§ 1409 on foreign-born illegitimate children, § 1401(g) could possibly be read as applying only to legitimate children. See Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1448
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[A] unitary statute is not to be picked apart in this
fashion."). Since the text of section 1401 (g) does not so specify, however, the court
of appeals concluded that Miller could be granted citizenship by that provision if the
additional requirements of § 1409 are invalidated. See Miller, 96 F.3d at 1470.
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that Miller lacked standing to vindicate her father's constitutional
rights.3
Since the INA treats the legitimate children of citizen-mothers
virtually the same as the illegitimate children of citizen-mothers, 9 the
appeals court reduced the case to a single question: "[W]hether the
additional requirements imposed by section [309] (a) on the illegitimate child of an American father represent an unconstitutional denial of equal protection based on (a) the status of the child and (b)
the sex of the parent."40

The court answered this single question in

the negative*' - thinking it rational for Congress to conclude that
the illegitimate, foreign-born children of citizen-fathers are less likely
to develop necessary early bonds to both the United States and those
relatives who are American citizens.42
The United States Supreme Court granted Miller's petition for a
writ of certiorari. 4 3 In a splintered 6-3 judgment, with the nine Justices fragmented into four voting blocks, the Court decided the case
See Miller, 96 F.3d at 1470 ("Because he is not a party to this appeal..,
the
claim is not properly before the court."). Mr. Miller had been dismissed from the
case when it was still in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. See
supra note 28.
9 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (proclaiming that illegitimate children of American mothers are granted U.S. citizenship at birth - provided minimal residency requirements are satisfied), with 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (announcing that every
(legitimate) child born abroad to at least one citizen parent is a U.S. citizen at birth
- provided minimal residency requirements are satisfied). The text of § 1401(g) is
not explicitly restricted to legitimate children. See 8 U.S.C. § 14 0 1(g). Given the
statute's additional requirements for illegitimate children, however, such a conclusion is logically inferred. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1448 (Scalia, J., concurring).
40 Miller, 96 F.3d. at
1471.
41 See id. at 1471-72.
Circuit Judge Wald reluctantly concurred in the judgment.
See id. at 1473 (Wald, J., concurring). The judge noted the striking fact that Miller
would be a United States citizen today had she obtained her paternity decree a "little
more than a year" sooner. Id. The judge explained that under § 1409(a), "Miller
was only required to have established her paternity by legitimation [by] the age of
twenty-one in order to qualify for citizenship." Id. at n.1.
Unlike the majority, Judge Wald perceived no rational basis for the requirements federal citizenship laws place on the foreign-born illegitimate children of
American men. See id. at 1473-74. (Wald, J., concurring). The judge believed the
additional requirements are rooted in the stereotypical assumption that mothers are
naturally closer to their children than fathers. See id. Nonetheless, Judge Wald concluded the outcome was dictated by existing precedent. See id. at 1477 (Wald, J.,
concurring) (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 (1977)).
42 See id. at 1472 (citing Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d
801, 806 (9th Cir. 1995)).
43 See Miller v. Albright, 117 S. Ct. 1551 (1997).
In a subsequent order, the Court
amended its grant of certiorari by limiting the appeal to a single question: "Is the
distinction in 8 U.S.C. § 1409 between 'illegitimate' children of U.S. citizen mothers
and 'illegitimate' children of U.S. citizen fathers a violation of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution?" Miller v. Albright, 117 S. Ct. 1689 (1997).
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against Miller. In the lead opinion, authored by Justice Stevens and
joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the Justices essentially adopted the
reasoning of the court of appeals. Justice O'Connor, joined byJustice Kennedy, doubted that the sex-based distinction could survive
heightened scrutiny, 46 but concurred in the outcome on standing
grounds.4 ' For reasons "more fundamental," Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, also concurred in the judgment - stressing the
Court's powerlessness to grant the desired remedy.48 The remaining
Justices voiced their disagreement with the result through two separate dissenting opinions.49
Although the Court conclusively ended the dispute between
Miller and Secretary of State Albright, the splintered judgment in this
case did nothing to settle the important ° legal question for which the
Court granted certiorari. 5' Resolution of the legal question would
have refined our understanding of the otherwise indeterminate
boundary between the Constitution's guarantee of equality under the
" See Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1442 (1998). Justice Stevens delivered
the judgment of the Court and authored an opinion, in which Chief Justice Renquist joined. See id. at 1432. Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, in which Justice Kennedy joined. See id. at 1442 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice
Thomas joined. See id. at 1446 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg dissented
and filed an opinion in which Justice Souter and Justice Breyer joined. See id. at
1449 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer dissented and filed an opinion in
which Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburgjoined. See id. at 1455 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1428-42. One point of technical disagreement, however, was that the
court of appeals explicitly relied on Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), whereas the
lead opinion concluded that it was not necessary to decide whether Fiallo dictated
the outcome. See id. at 1434-35.
See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1445 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I do not share Justice Stevens's assessment that the provision withstands heightened scrutiny...
47 See id. at 1442-46 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
48 See id. at 1446-49 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Like the district court in this case,
Justice Scalia relied heavily on INS v. Pangilinan,486 U.S. 875 (1988). See Miller, 118
S. Ct. at 1448.
49 See Miller, 118 S.Ct. at 1449-55 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 1455-64
(Breyer,J., dissenting).
See generally SHKLAR, supra note 1, at 1 ("There is no notion more central in
politics than citizenship ....
");see also KENNETH L. KARsT, BELONGING TO AMERICA at
ix (1989) (highlighting the importance of equal participation in the political community to one's sense of belonging). In answer to the question, "Who belongs to
America?," the author notes: "Successive generations of Americans have answered
the question differently, with grave consequences for the people excluded."
Id.
(emphasis added).
See MOORE,ET AL., supra note 12, § 134.04 ("An affirmance by an equally divided court does not constitute a precedent.") (citing United States ex rel. Radich v.
Criminal Court, 459 F.2d 745, 750 (2d Cir. 1972)).
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law, on the one hand, and the sovereign's historically absolute control over matters affecting immigration and citizenship, on the
other.
Today, American citizenship law is a combination of the
"competing, but often complementary" principles of jus soli and jus
sanguinis.53 From time immemorial, the rule of the British common
law was jus soli - the notion that a person's citizenship is fixed by his
or her place of birth.54 Jus soli was particularly well-suited to a feudal
society, 5 in which the great mass of the peasantry was "bound to the
soil," unable to travel beyond the lord's estate without permission.5 6
Ancient Roman civilization, by contrast, was exceedingly more cosmopolitan in nature. 57 As such, the Romans developed the principle
of jus sanguinis - a system of citizenship based on blood relationships.58
The antebellum Constitution lacks specificity about the legal basis for acquiring American citizenship.59 Prior to the enactment of
52

See infra notes 53-107 and accompanying text.

53 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 93.01[1].

See id. § 92.03 [1] [a] ("Despite its feudal origin, this rule was found to be a
reasonable criterion for the modern world, since it made possible certainty in each
man's political status.").
55 See id. ("The jus soli emerged out of feudal concepts of allegiance, and was
peculiarly fitted to the isolated society of England in the early days of the common
law.").
56 See RR PALMER &JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 29 (8th ed.
1995). Few peasants wanted to leave the manor anyway "at a time when the world
beyond the village was unknown and dangerous, and filled at best only with other
similar manors in which opportunities were no different." Id.
57 See MICHAEL GRANT, THE FOUNDERS OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A HISTORY
OF
GREECE AND ROME 217-18 (1991) (describing ancient Roman civilization as "a vast
multi-racial society"); PALMER & COLTON, supra note 56, at 14 ("[V]irtually the entire
civilized world of the ancient West was politically united and enjoyed generations of
internal peace. Rome was the center, around which in all directions lay the 'circle
of lands,' the orbis terrarum, the known world ....
").

58 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 93.01[1] ("The jus sanguinis was the basic
rule of the Roman or civil law, under which a child's nationality status followed that
of its parent, and nationality was transmitted only by descent.").
59 SeeMinorv. Happerset, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 165 (1874) ("Before [the
Fourteenth Amendment's] adoption the Constitution of the United States did not in
terms prescribe who should be citizens of the United States or of the several States
yet there were necessarily such citizens without such provision."); see also AUSTIN T.
FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE TO LAW AND
PRAcTIcE 12-1 (4th ed. 1997) ("Until the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment... no formal
definition of citizenship was contained in U.S. constitutional or statutory law.").
The United States Supreme Court has observed that this "lack of definitional
specificity may well have been attributable in part to the desire to avoid entanglement in the then-existing controversy between concepts of state and national citizenship and with the difficult question of the status of Negro slaves." Rogers v. Bellei,
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the Fourteenth Amendment, American courts applied the abovedescribed rules of the British common law, not the Constitution, to
decide this issue.f' Indeed, the Constitution seemed more concerned
with protecting the rights of "people," not some legal concept called
"the citizen."' The Supreme Court's infamous decision in Dred Scott
v. Sandford,2 however, provided the impetus for incorporating the jus
soli principle into the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 In the Slaughter401 U.S. 815, 829 (1971). Other writers suggest that the framers, wishing to attract
immigrants, "plainly assumed that birth as well as naturalization would confer citizenship but they made nothing depend on it explicitly, aside from a few offices...."
BICKEL, supra note 1, at 35.
COSee United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 658 (1898) ("The same rule
was in force in all the English Colonies upon this continent down to the time of the
Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to
prevail under the Constitution as originally established."). This "same rule" referred
to by the Supreme Court was stated succinctly in another early American case:
"Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children
even of aliens born in a country, while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government, and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by
birth." Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 164 (1830).
As far back as 1350, the common law rule of jus soli has been supplemented by
legislative enactments that endowed citizenship on certain classes of individuals not
born in England. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 668. This practice was copied in the
United States. See Act of March 26, 1790, ch.3, 1 Stat. 103, 103-04 (repealed 1795).
61 See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 36. In support of this idea,
the author observes:
The Preamble speaks of "We the people of the United States," not, as
it might have, of we the citizens of the United States at the time of the
formation of this union. And the Bill of Rights throughout defines
rights of people, not of citizens ....

To be sure, implicitly, the citizen

had a right freely to enter the country, whereas the alien did not; and
implicitly also the citizen, while abroad, could be held to an obligation
of allegiance and might under very specific conditions be found guilty
of the crime of treason for violating it, while the alien generally could
not. But these were hardly critical points, as the Framers demonstrated by saying nothing explicit about them. It remains true that the
original Constitution presented the edifying picture of a government
that bestowed rights on people and persons, and held itself out as
bound by certain standards of conduct in its relations with people and
persons, not with some legal construct called citizen.
Id.

62 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that a black man born
in Missouri was
not a citizen of the United States entitled to protection under the Constitution).
63 See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 41 ("The Dred Scott decision had to be effectively,

which is to say constitutionally, overruled by a definition of citizenship in which race
played no part. So, in a fashion no one quite understood but everyone apparently
found necessary, Dred Scott was exorcized.").
Actually, the first attempt to overrule the Dred Scott decision was the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. See Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 ("[A]II persons born
in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not
taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States."). It was feared, however, that a mere statutory enactment would be an insufficient safeguard. See Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 675 ("The same Congress, shortly afterwards, evidently thinking
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House Cases," though, the Court drained the recently secured national citizenship of any meaningful content.6 Still, given the much
sought-after nature of American citizenship, 66 the Court has had further opportunities
to construe the first sentence of the Fourteenth
7
Amendment.1
There is rarely a dispute over what it means to be born within
the territory of the United States. 6 The key phrase in the Citizenship
Clause,6 therefore, would appear to be "subject to the jurisdiction
thereof."70 In United States v. Wong Kim Ark,7 the Court interpreted
that phrase as excluding only the children of diplomats, Native
Americans, and hostile occupying soldiers. 7 Thus, a man born in
it unwise, and perhaps unsafe, to leave so important a declaration of rights to depend upon an ordinary act of legislation, which might be repealed by any subsequent Congress, framed the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution .
).
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
65 See id. at 79-80 (concluding that the privileges and immunities
of national citizenship are few indeed - including only the rights to use the navigable waters of
the United States, peacefully assemble and petition the national government for redress of grievances, and the privilege of habeas corpus); BICKEL, supra note 1, at 45
("While we now have a definition of citizenship in the Constitution we still set very
little store by it.").
67 See supra note 1.
68 See infra notes 71-105 and accompanying text.
See GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 92.03[2] [b] (listing the many statutes that
have supplemented the constitutional directive - making disputes over the territorial limits of the United States unnecessary). For example, the territorial limits of
the United States, for citizenship purposes, have been statutorily extended to places
such as Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands of the United States, and Guam. See id. Notably, however, children born on U.S. installations in foreign countries are not
treated as born within the United States "for the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the related statutes." Id. § 92.03[2] [d].
69 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 ("All persons born or naturalized
in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.").
70 Id.; see United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 682 (1898)
(noting that
the phrase "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof' was intended to qualify the general grant of citizenship).
7 169 U.S. 649 (1898). The case was an appeal of a district
court's denial of a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See id. at 649. The petitioner was being held in
the custody of the collector of customs, after having been denied admission to the
United States (following a brief visit to China). See id.
The United States, in its brief opposing the writ, conceded that Wong Kim Ark
had been born in California. See id. at 650. Nonetheless, the government argued
that "said Wong Kim Ark has been at all times, by reason of his race, language, color
and dress, a Chinese person ....
" Id.
7
See id. at 675-94. The Court explained:
The real object of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in
qualifying the words, "All persons born in the United States," by the
addition, "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," would appear to
have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words, (besides children
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San Francisco to parents who were both Chinese subjects, was
granted access to the United States on the grounds that he was a
American citizen 1 - notwithstanding a later-enacted federal statute
that excluded Chinese people from the United States.7 ' Wong Kim
Ark effectively removed any doubts about the status of persons born
or naturalized in the United States.75
In Afroyim v. Rusk,' the Warren Court converted that citizenship,
once acquired, into an inviolate possession." At issue was section
of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the
National Government, unknown to the common law,) the two classes
of cases - children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation, and
children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign State - both of
which, as has already been shown, by the law of England, and by our
own law, from the time of the first settlement of the English colonies
in America, had been recognized exceptions to the fundamental rule
of citizenship by birth within the country.
Id. at 682 (citations omitted).
73 See id. at 705 (concluding that Wong Kim Ark is
a citizen).
74 See Act of May 6, 1982, ch. 126, 47 Stat. 58 (providing
that "[w]hereas, in the
opinion of the Government of the United States the coming of Chinese laborers to
this country endangers the good order of certain localities within the territory
thereof," the immigration of Chinese labors is suspended). The national policy of
excluding the Chinese was the culmination of a nativist labor movement called the
"Workingmen's Party of California." See GEORGE BROwN TINDALL, AMERIcA: A
NARRATWE HisToRY VOL. II 800 (2d ed. 1988). The movement was lead and organized, ironically, by an Irish immigrant named Dennis Kearney. See id. While Kearney's party eventually crumbled, "his anti-Chinese theme became a national issue,
and in 1882 Congress voted to prohibit Chinese immigration for ten years." Id. The
10-year period was a compromise reached after President Arthur had vetoed a 20year ban. See id. at 829. The ban was periodically extended and then made permanent in 1904. See id.
At the core of this nakedly racist sentiment was resentment at the Chinese for a
willingness to work for less pay. See id. at 828. "[B]ut their greatest sin, the New York
Nation opined, was perpetuating 'those disgusting habits of thrift, industry, and selfdenial."' Id. at 828-29.
The Court said of the later-enacted statute: "The acts of Congress, known as the
Chinese Exclusion Acts, the earliest of which was passed some fourteen years after
the adoption of the Constitutional Amendment, cannot control its meaning, or impair its effect, but must be construed and executed in subordination to its provisions." Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 699.
75 See supra note 74.
76 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
77 See id. at 268 ("We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed
to, and
does, protect every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction
of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race."). With this five-to-four decision, the Court explicitly overruled a ten-year old precedent. See id. ("Perez v.
Brownell is overruled.").
The Court's reasoning in Afroyim was not terribly persuasive. See id. at 268-93
(Harlan,J., dissenting) (refuting the Court's reasoning and concluding that the outcome was based on "the present majority's own distaste for the expatriation power").
Of particular significance, Justice Harlan noted that "Congress had twice, immedi-
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40(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940, which involuntarily expatriated
any citizen who had demonstrated diluted allegiance to the United
States by voting in a foreign election. 8 The Court combined testimony from the Congressional Record' with obiter dictum from an
earlier case 0 and concluded that the "undeniable purpose" of the
Citizenship Clause was to ensure that no citizen could ever be involuntarily expatriated - no matter how overt an act of disloyalty the
"citizen" might have committed. 8'
ately before its passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, unequivocally affirmed its
belief that it had authority to expatriate an unwilling citizen." Id. at 282. The majority dismissed these statutes by arguing that "[m]easures... passed in ... days of
emotional distress and hostility are by no means the most reliable criteria for determining what the Constitution means." Id. at 261 n.15.
78 See Act of Oct. 14, 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1168-69 (providing
that any person
who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization "shall lose
his nationality by: [vioting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in
an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory .... ").
See, e.g., Statement of Senator Howard, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2890, 2896 (1866). The Afroyim majority prominently highlighted the following excerpt: "'It settles the great question of citizenship and removes all doubt as to what
persons are or are not citizens of the United States .... We desired to put this question of citizenship and the rights of citizens.., under the civil rights bill beyond the
legislative power .....
Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 263 (quoting Senator Howard, CONG.
GLOBE at 2896).
Justice Harlan gave the full story, by noting the following quote, located between
the two short statements cited by the majority: "I take it for granted that when a
man becomes a citizen of the United States under the Constitution he cannot cease
to be a citizen, except by expatriation or the commission of some crime by which his citizenship shall be forfeited." Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 286 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Statement of Senator Howard, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2895 (1866))
(alteration in original). The far superior conclusion, Justice Harlan deduced, is that
the Citizenship Clause was intended to ensure that all blacks born in the United
States became citizens - contrary to the holding of Dred Scott. See id. at 292 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
so See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824).
The Osborn majority stated, "The simple power of the national Legislature, is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so
far as respects the individual." Id.
Again,Justice Harlan gave the full story. See Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 275-76 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). In Osborn, a central issue was whether the mere enactment of the law
creating the federal bank was sufficient to grant "arising under" federal jurisdiction
(in an ordinary state cause of action). See Osborn, 22 U.S. at 817. The lawyers opposing federal jurisdiction argued, by analogy, that a statutory grant of citizenship might
similarly be sufficient to create federal jurisdiction for any action involving the new
citizen. See id. at 813-14. Chief Justice Marshall's rejection of the analogy, Justice
Harlan explained, "plainly meant no more than that counsel's analogy is broken by
Congress's inability to offer a naturalized citizen rights or capacities that differ in any
particular from those given to a native-born citizen at birth." Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 276
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
81 See Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 263 ("Though the framers
of the Amendment were not
particularly concerned with the problem of expatriation, it seems undeniable from
the language they used that they wanted to put citizenship beyond the power of any
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The protection handed to disloyal citizens in Afroyim was weakened considerably five years later in Rogers v. Bellei,s2 a case which
turned on the proper meaning of the preposition "in.""3 The petitioner in Rogers, a child born and naturalized overseas to an American mother, was expatriated after failing to comply with federal residency requirements."' In upholding those requirements, the Court
reasoned that people who become naturalized citizens by blooddescent while residing outside the United States, not "subject to the
jurisdiction thereof,"8 5 are not "Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence
citizen [s] ."86 Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment, by implication, does

not bar Congress from placing conditions-subsequent on the reten-

governmental unit to destroy.").
In the years following Perez v. Brownel4 356 U.S. 44 (1958), which had upheld
Congress's power to expatriate, the Court had been gradually moving toward its position in Afroyim See, e.g., Schnieder v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1964) (holding
that expatriation for continuous and extended overseas residence is unconstitutional); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165-66 (1963) (holding that
expatriation of citizens who fled the country in order to avoid the draft is a form of
punishment that may not be meted out without the traditional constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants).
82 401 U.S. 815 (1971). The dissenters in this case disingenuously
accused the
majority of taking advantage of the changed composition of the Court to "overrule"
Afroyim. See id. at 837 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Now this Court, by a vote of five to
four through a simple change in its composition, overrules that decision."). In fact,
Afroyim (itself a five-to-four decision), was an example of the Warren Court explicitly
overruling a then-recent decision that it disliked, Perez v. Brownell 356 U.S. 44
(1958). SeeAfroyim, 387 U.S. at 268.
93
See Rogers, 401 U.S. at 827. The "central fact," the Court reasoned, was that
the
plaintiff was born abroad. See id. ("He was not born in the United States. He was
not naturalized in the United States. And he has not been subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States.") (emphasis added).
The dissenters rejected the majority's emphasis on the need to be naturalized
"in" the United States. See id. at 843 (Black, J., dissenting) ("I cannot accept the narrow and extraordinarily technical reading of the Fourteenth Amendment employed
by the Court today."). Instead of employing such a technical reading, Justice Black
argued that the word "in" has two different meanings - born within the United
States or naturalized into it. See id.
See id. at 817-18. The statutes in existence at the time required persons naturalized abroad to reside within the United States for a continuous five-year period
while the persons were between the ages of 14 and 28. SeeAct ofJune 27, 1952, ch.1,
66 Stat. 236.
85 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 1, 66 Stat.
236 § 301(a)(7)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 140 1 (g) (1986)) (providing that persons born
abroad "of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United
States[,]" are citizens at birth). Afroyim, by contrast, was naturalized "in" the United
States. See Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 254. This is important for later analysis because
Miller, if a citizen at all, is not a Fourteenth Amendment first-sentence citizen. See
Miller v. Christopher, 870 F. Supp. 1, 1 (D.D.C. 1994).
86 Rogers, 401 U.S. at 827.
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tion of their "statutory" citizenship.87 With Rogers, the law has come
almost full circle - a basic constitutional rule of jus soli, supplemented by legislatively-granted or withdrawn citizenship under principles of jus sanguinis.88
Employing the new concept of the "Fourteenth-Amendmentfirst-sentence citizen," the Court next decided that a deferential standard of review should apply when adjudicating the claims of persons
falling outside that category. 9 In deciding Fiallo v. BelI, 9 the Court
was required to assess the constitutionality of a federal statute that
granted preferential immigration treatment to all children or parents
87

See id. at 835 ("We do not accept the notion that [the words of the Fourteenth

Amendment] are now to be judicially extended to citizenship not based upon the
Fourteenth Amendment and to make citizenship an absolute.").
The Court's reasoning rested largely on the notion that Congress had been
generous enough to grant citizenship at birth to aliens born abroad. See id. ("A contrary holding would convert what is congressional generosity into something unanticipated and obviously undesired by the Congress."). The Court noted how the
relevant statutory provision became more and more generous over the years, changing from "complete disqualification [of persons born abroad to citizen-mothers] to
citizenship upon a condition subsequent, with that condition being expanded and
made less onerous ....
" Id. at 826.
For the purposes of analyzing Miller v. Albright, the real importance of Rogers lies
in the constitutional wedge the Court drove between the two categories of citizens.
See id. at 839 (Black, J., dissenting) ("I cannot accept the Court's conclusion that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the citizenship of some Americans and not others.").
See supra text accompanying note 53 ("Today, American citizenship law is
a
combination of the 'competing, but often complementary' principles of jus soli and
jus sanguinis.").
The law has come almost full circle because, after Rogers, persons naturalized
"in" the United States are not treated like other "statutory" citizens who are naturalized "outside" the United States. See supra note 83.
89 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798 (1977) ("[I]t is clear from our
cases... that
these [decisions about how to treat aliens seeking entry to the United States] are
policy questions entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our Government,
and we have no judicial authority to substitute our political judgment for that of the
Congress.").
The Court elaborated on this point in an eloquently worded footnote:
Although few, if any, countries have been as generous as the United
States in extending the privilege to immigrate, or in providing sanctuary to the oppressed, limits and classifications as to who shall be admitted are traditional and necessary elements of legislation in this
area .... In the inevitable process of "line-drawing," Congress has determined that certain classes of aliens are more likely than others to
satisfy national objectives without undue cost, and it has granted preferential status only to those classes.
Id. at 795 n.6. If one accepts the premise that statutory at-birth citizens are actually
born "aliens" but granted a "privilege" by Congress, this reasoning becomes directly
applicable to Miller v. Albright.
430 U.S. 787 (1977).
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of current citizens. 9' The statute denied such preferential treatment,
however, to the illegitimate children of citizen-fathers and the fathers
of illegitimate citizen-children.9 2
The plaintiff-appellants alleged that this distinction violated or
at least burdened their constitutional rights to equal protection, due
process of law, and mutual association. 93 Recalling that "in the exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturalization,
'Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens,"'94 the Court concluded that any "facially legitimate
and bona fide" justification offered in support of the statute would
suffice.95 Thus, a legislative judgment that, in most cases, fathers and
their illegitimate children lack close family ties is a "facially legitimate" justification for the double-barreled discrimination 96 manifested in the law. 97
Even if a plaintiff is able to argue successfully that a given legislative distinction must be invalidated for want of a "facially legitimate"
justification, the Court held in INS v. Pangilinan8 that federal courts
lack the power to grant citizenship under principles of equity, estoppel, or any other judicial tool.99 Pangilinaninvolved an expired statutory provision under which Congress had temporarily delegated
91

See id. at 789 (citations omitted).

92 See id. at 788 (citation omitted).
93

See id. at 791.

,4 Id. at 792 (quoting Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,
80 (1976)).
95 Id. at 794-95 (adopting the standard of Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972)). Kleindienst involved a congressional statute that delegated to the Attorney
General the power to exclude any alien who advocated the international, governmental, and economic doctrines of world communism. See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at
754-55. The Court held:
[W] hen the Executive exercises this power negatively on the basis of a
facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look
behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant.
Id. at 770. The Fiallo majority saw "no reason to review the broad congressional policy choice at issue here under a more exacting standard ..... Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 795.
96 Double-barreled discrimination describes the appellants'
challenge to discrimination based on both the sex of the parent and the legitimacy status of the
child. SeeFiallo, 430 U.S. at 791.
97 See id. at 799 (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977)). The
Court
also proffered, as a possible justification, that Congress might legitimately be concerned about "the serious problems of proof that usually lurk in paternity determinations." Id.
98 486 U.S. 875
(1988).
99 See id. at 885 ("Neither by application of the doctrine
of estoppel, nor by invocation of equitable powers, nor by any other means does a court have the power to
confer citizenship in violation of [the limitations imposed by statute].").
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naturalization authority to the American Vice Counsel in the Philippines."' The sixteen plaintiff-respondents argued that the Attorney
General's temporary revocation of that temporary authority'0 1 infringed upon their Fifth Amendment due process rights, t2 even
though most of them had taken no "affirmative steps to be naturalized before the cutoff date.'0 3 The Ninth Circuit had held that naturalization was a valid judicial remedy for the government's violation
of the mandatory exercise of delegated power.' °4 Noting the uncontested fact that a statutory right of citizenship no longer exists, the
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit, declining to "'create a
05
remedy in violation of [the] law."

The foregoing describes an increasingly hostile legal climate
confronting any plaintiff who seeks to challenge congressional linedrawing in the areas of immigration and naturalization.
It is perhaps surprising, then, that in Miller v. Albright the Supreme Court
agreed to hear an equal protection challenge to a federal citizenship
law that discriminates against the foreign-born, illegitimate children
of American men.0 7 The Court affirmed the dismissal of Miller's
claims.Its

10oSee id. at 877 (citing Nationality Act of 1940 §§ 701-705, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137,
amended by Second War Powers Act of 1942 §§ 1001-1005, ch. 199, 56 Stat. 182).
101 See id. at 880 ("[Tlhe Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) apparently [took] the position that appointment of such an official was authorized but not
mandated.").
The authority was revoked at the behest of the Philippine government, which
was concerned that "a mass migration of newly naturalized veterans would drain the
country of essential manpower, undermining postwar reconstruction efforts in the
soon-to-be independent country." Id. at 879.
102 See id.
at 876.
103 Id.
at 880.
:04 See Pangilinan v. INS, 796 F.2d 1091, 1102 (9th Cir. 1986).
05 Pangilinan,486 U.S. at 883 (quoting Rees v. Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)
107, 122 (1874) ("A Court of equity cannot, by avowing that there is a right but no
remedy known to the law, create a remedy in violation of law.
)).
:06 See supra notes 53-105 and accompanying text.
07
See Miller v. Albright, 118 S.Ct. 1428 (1998). The Supreme Court did
not
provide any specific reason for its decision to grant certiorari. See Miller v. Albright,
117 S. Ct. 1689 (1997) (granting limited certiorari). The decision to do so, however,
seems somewhat puzzling in light of the fact that existing precedent seemed exactly
on point. See Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1473 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald, J.,
concurring) (reluctantly concluding that the Court's holding in Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787 (1977), was dispositive). Furthermore, both the court of appeals from
which the Supreme Court took the case, see Miller, 96 F.3d at 1467, and other courts
of appeals that had decided the precise issue for which the Court granted certiorari,
see Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 806 (9th Cir. 1995), were in agreement with the
eventual outcome of Miller v. Albright.
o8 See Miller, 118 S.Ct. at 1442. Given the absence of a majority opinion, the
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In an intricately reasoned opinion,'1Justice Stevens, joined only
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concluded that the gender-based requirements of INA section 309 do not violate the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment."' As an important threshold

matter, however, the Justice first restricted the case to an analysis of
sub-section 309(a) (4), which requires some formal proof of pater-

nity."' Addressing a second preliminary matter, Justice Stevens characterized the overall purpose of section 309 as specifying the ability
of unmarried citizens, "acting separately," to transmit citizenship to

foreign-born children.12 Astonishingly, the Justice contended that
the law is actually more burdensome to American mothers than it is
to American fathers."1
Court's only legally operative act was to affirm the judgment of the court of appeals,
which itself was to affirm the district court's dismissal of the claim. See id.
109See id. at 1432-42. By first addressing and disposing of several threshold issues
that "need not be resolve[d]," Justice Stevens carefully narrowed the issue even
more than what was outlined in the limited grant of certiorari. See id. 1434-36.
First, Justice Stevens disclaimed the applicability of Fiallo - citing two reasons
why that case is distinguishable: (1) The petitioners in Fiallo conceded they were
aliens, and (2) the grant of certiorari in this case did not encompass the illegitimate
versus legitimate distinctions at issue in Fiallo. See id. at 1434-35.
Second, Justice Stevens briefly responded to the arguments raised in the two
concurring opinions, concluding: (1) The Court is empowered to grant a remedy,
and (2) the third-party standing "problem" is insufficient to mandate dismissal of
any claims rooted in alleged violations of Miller's father's rights. See id. at 1436.
Finally, the Justice dismissed as irrelevant the argument that aliens living outside the United States do not have rights cognizable under the Constitution. See id.
at 1436 n.10.
10 See id. at 1432 ("We therefore conclude that the statutory distinction is neither
arbitrary nor invidious.").
HI See8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (4) (1994). Justice Stevens was able to narrow the focus
by finding reasons to eliminate the other subsections from consideration. See Miller,
118 S.Ct. at 1436. The Justice concluded:
[T]he only issue presented by the facts of this case is whether the requirement in § 1409(a)(4) - that children born out of wedlock to
citizen fathers, but not citizen mothers, obtain formal proof of paternity by age 18, either through legitimation, written acknowledgment by
the father under oath, or adjudication by a competent court - violates
the Fifth Amendment.
Id.
Id2 See

Miller, 118 S.Ct. at 1436-37. There is no question that a married couple
can transmit citizenship - provided at least one of the parents is an American citizen. See8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994). This seeming discrimination against illegitimate
children was not encompassed in the limited grant of certiorari. See Miller v. Albright, 117 S. Ct. 1689 (1997).
The requirements for unmarried citizen mothers are contained in § 1409(c).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1994). The requirements for unmarried citizen fathers are
contained in § 1409(a)(1)-(4). See id. § 1409(a)(1)-(4).
1s See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1437. Justice Stevens
argued that "the burdens imposed
on the female citizen are more severe than those imposed on the male citizen ....
"
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Justice Stevens adopted a curious approach to analyzing the
statute. 14 While insisting that the "gender equality principle... is
only indirectly involved,"". 5 the Justice's primary defense of the law
utilized the language of heightened scrutiny.1 6 For example, Justice
Stevens cited several "important governmental objective [s]""7 justifying the additional burdens faced by men."8 In particular, the Justice
Id. The Justice arrived at this conclusion by noting that, in order to transmit citizenship, unmarried males "need not participate in the decision to give birth rather than
to choose an abortion; he need not be present at the birth; and for at least 17 years
thereafter he need not provide any paternal support, either moral or financial, to
either the mother or the child... " Id.
It is not unusual for Justice Stevens to arrive at somewhat counter-intuitive interpretations of societal discrimination. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (concluding that a state drinking-age law that applied only
to men "is a mere remnant of the now almost universally rejected tradition of discriminating against males in this age bracket .... "). Given the year that the Craig
opinion was written, it is perhaps explainable by reference to the youthful age of
most of the American men who lost their lives in the Vietnam War.
114 See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1436-42.
The analysis is "curious" because Justice Stevens suggests that gender is not at issue, but then uses language that is remarkably
close to traditional "medium scrutiny." See id. This unwillingness to apply the
Court's formal methodology is not surprising, however, when one considers Justice
Stevens's earlier comments on the multi-tiered structure of equal protection analysis.
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451-52 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("I have never been persuaded that these so called 'standards' adequately explain the decisional process .... In my own approach to these cases, I
have always asked myself whether I could find a 'rational basis' for the classification
at issue."); Craig, 429 U.S. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[W]hat has become
known as the two-tiered analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion.").
Recent trends in equal protection suggest a breakdown of the formal multitiered approach. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)
(holding that gender discrimination, analyzed under medium scrutiny, requires an
"exceedingly persuasive justification."); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)
(analyzing and invalidating, under rational basis review, state constitutional provision discriminating against a politically unpopular group (homosexuals)); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."') (citations omitted).
Precisely for the uncertainty it created, Chief Justice Rehnquist objected to the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" standard announced in United States v. Virginia.
See Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice
articulated: "We have adhered to [medium scrutiny] ever since [Craig v. Boren].
While the majority adheres to this test today, it also says that the State must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' to support a gender-based classification. It is unfortunate that the Court thereby introduces an element of uncertainty
respecting the appropriate test." Id. (citations omitted).
5 Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1441.
116 See id. at 1436-40.
"7
See id. at 1438.
H8 See id. at 1438-40. Justice Stevens pointed to three important governmental
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noted valid congressional concerns about the genuineness of the familial and national bonds developed by children who are conceived
in fleeting unions between their mothers and their American servicemen-fathers."" Justice Stevens then argued that the means employed by section 309(a) (4) are "well tailored"'20 to achieving those
objectives.12 ' A requirement for some affirmative act of legitimation,
the Justice maintained, is eminently reasonable given the inherent
difficulties
in proving paternity, versus the rather obvious fact of ma22
ternity.1

After implicitly concluding that the law withstands heightened
scrutiny, Justice Stevens then briefly suggested that such an exacting
level of judicial review is not even necessary. 2 3 The Justice insisted
that the
gender-equality principle applied in the classic
stereotype
124,
125
cases

is only tangentially involved in Miller's case. 1

Specifically,

Justice Stevens explained that the outcome of the case does not rest
solely on her father's gender, but rather on several coinciding factors.

26

Finally, with respect to the gender biases upon which the stat-

objectives. See id. First, the Justice noted the need to prevent fraud by ensuring reliable proof of paternity. See id. at 1438. Second,Justice Stevens cited the importance
of developing healthy ties between the child and citizen-parent. See id. at 1439. Finally, the Justice mentioned the importance of developing a bond to the United
States. See id.
119 See id. at 1439. The Court
emphasized:
Given the size of the American military establishment that has been
stationed in various parts of the world for the past half century ....Congress had legitimate concerns about a class of children
born abroad out of wedlock to alien mothers and to American servicemen who would not necessarily know about, or be known by, their
children.

Id.

120

See id. at 1440.
Miller; 118 S. Ct. at 1440.
See id. In upholding the additional affirmative steps required of men, the Jus-

121 See
122

tice relied explicitly on Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). See id. That case upheld a New York law that gave mothers of illegitimate children the right to veto an
adoption, but denied fathers the same right unless they had performed some affirmative act of paternity. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251-52.
123 See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at
1440-42.
124 See, e.g., United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (to train for military
service); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (to engage in
professional nursing); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (to appoint as administrator
of a decedent's estate).
125 See Miller, 118 S.
Ct. at 1441.
126 See id.
Justice Stevens explained, for example, that "even if petitioner's
mother had been a citizen and her father had been the alien, petitioner would not
qualify for citizenship because her mother had never been to the United States." Id.
(footnote omitted).
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ute is supposedly premised,1 7 Justice Stevens argued that relevant
biological and sociological differences, 21 8 not outmoded stereotypes,
are what motivate the law's distinctions. 12
For entirely different reasons, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurred in the judgment.1 0
Underscoring the
Court's prudential rule against third-party standing (jus tertiz),"' the
Justice argued that Miller should not be allowed to challenge a statute that discriminates based on the sex of the parent.1 2 Nonetheless,
See id. ("'[T]he American father is never anything more than the proverbial
breadwinner who remains aloof from the day-to-day child rearing duties,' and. . . 'a
mother will be closer to her child born out of wedlock than a father will be to his."')
(citations omitted).
128 See id. at 1442 ("The biological differences
between single men and single
women provide a relevant basis for differing rules .... ).
1
See id. ("These assumptions are firmly grounded and adequately explain
why
Congress found it unnecessary to impose requirements on the mother that were entirely appropriate for the father.").
1o See id. at 1442-46 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
1
See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1442 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Justice emphasized the Court's long-held presumption against "'resolving a controversy, even one
within their constitutional power to resolve, on the basis of the rights of third persons not parties to the litigation."' Id. (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113
(1976)). It is not enough that the plaintiff was injured by the unconstitutional conduct, Justice O'Connor continued, he must also demonstrate that "'he is within the
class of persons with respect to whom the act is unconstitutional."' Id. at 1443
(quoting Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U.S. 114, 123 (1922)).
Justice O'Connor argued that established precedents permit exceptions to the
prudential limitation only when three interrelated criteria are present. See id. First,
the plaintiff invoking third-party standing must have suffered a concrete injury. See
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991). Second, the plaintiff must have a close
relationship with the person whose rights are being asserted. See id. Finally, there
must be some obstacle preventing the third-party from asserting his own rights. See
id. Justice O'Connor disputed that Charlie Miller faced any genuine obstacle to asserting his own rights. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1444 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In
dissent,Justice Breyer contended that the cost and inconvenience of challenging his
dismissal from the case was a sufficient hindrance to allow Lorelyn to assert her father's rights. See id. at 1456 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[A]ppeals take time and
money; the transfer of venue left the plaintiffs uncertain about where to appeal; the
case was being heard with Lorelyn as plaintiff in any event; and the resulting comparison of costs and benefits (viewed prospectively) likely would have discouraged
Charlie's pursuit of the ... appeal route.").
Various justifications are traditionally offered in support of the prudential
standing limitation. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.4
(2d ed. 1994); Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277
(1984). First, the people whose rights are actually at stake may already be satisfied
and, thus, the jus tertii doctrine avoids "the adjudication of rights which those not
before the Court may not wish to assert .... " Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978). Second, limiting litigants to the assertion of
their own rights improves judicial decision-making because "third parties themselves
usually will be the best proponents of their own rights." Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114.
132 See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1443 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I do not believe that
17
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Justice O'Connor made a point of expressing disagreement with Justice Stevens's conclusion that section 309(a)(4) withstands heightened scrutiny.ss As for Miller's own claims, Justice O'Connor explained that they were either not encompassed
by the writ of
35
review.'
basis
rational
to
only
subject
or
'3
certiorari
In a third two-justice opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia,joined by Justice Thomas, articulated a more fundamental
reason for agreeing with the outcome.16 Even if section 309(a) (4) is
invalidated, Justice Scalia reasoned, the Court cannot grant the requested relief.'7 The Justice rejected the argument that, since the
general citizenship grant of section 301 (g) is not expressly limited to
legitimate children, 'ss Miller could become a citizen under that remaining section. 39 Emphasizing that "a unitary statute is not to be
picked apart in this fashion,"'4Justice Scalia concluded that Congress
would not have enacted the general grant of section 301 (g) without
the limitation of section 309(a).' 4' The Justice concluded, "If there is
no congressional42 enactment granting petitioner citizenship, she remains an alien.',
In dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsberg, questioned several of the points made in the three concurring
opinions. 43 Primarily, however, the dissenters challenged the stanwe should consider petitioner's gender discrimination claim.").
133See id. at 1445 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra note 46.
134 See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1445 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (stating that claims
based on discrimination against illegitimate children are not properly presented).
'115

See id.

,36See id. at 1446-49 (Scalia, J., concurring).
137See id. at 1447 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing INS v. Pangilinan,
486 U.S. 875,
884 (1988)).

,m See id. at 1448 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994)).
8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) grants citizenship to any child born abroad to parents, at least
one of whom is a U.S. citizen. See8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994).
139 See Miller, 118 S.Ct. at 1448 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (explaining that such an
argument relies on "a fanciful view of the statute whereby § 1409(a) takes away what
§ 1401(g) has unconditionally conferred ....
140

Id.

See id. at 1448-49 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Justice noted an additional
problem with the petitioner's request for invalidation of § 1409(a). See id. The Justice noted:
[Elliminating the restrictions on fathers does not produce a law that
complies with the Equal Protection Clause (assuming it is initially in
violation), but rather produces a law that treats fathers more favorably
than mothers. There is no way a court can "fix" the law by merely disregarding one provision or the other as unconstitutional.
Id. at 1449 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
142 Id. at 1446 (Scalia, J.concurring).
141

143

See id. at 1456-58, 1463-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

First, Justice Breyer dis-
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dard of review applied by Justice Stevens."4 Acknowledging that an
especially lenient standard of review applies in cases affecting aliens,' the Justice argued that Miller's claim of citizenship at birth necessitates "generally prevailing... standards of review .... ,,146 Since
the statute at issue contains gender-based distinctions, Justice Breyer
1 47
continued, only an "exceedingly persuasive justification" can save it.
Given the availability of inexpensive DNA testing, the Justice con48
tended, difficulties in proving paternity fall short of this standard.
Justice Breyer further insisted that the congressional objectives cited
by Justice Stevens could be met by less offensive distinctions - say,
between caretakers and non-caretakers. 9
Deferring to Justice Breyer's "convincing" demonstration of section 309's unconstitutionality,'5 Justice Ginsberg in a separate dissent, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, focused on the statute's
historical pedigree.'5' After illustrating what that history discloses,'52
puted Justice O'Connor's standing argument. See id. at 1456-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Justice contended that the obstacles placed by the government in the
path of Charlie Miller's assertion of his own rights constituted a substantial hindrance. See id. Specifically, the district court's apparently erroneous dismissal of
Miller's father from the case confronted him with the expense and inconvenience of
appealing that dismissal. See id. Secondly, Justice Breyer rejected Justice Scalia's
contention that any invalidation of § 1409(a) would leave the Court without a statutory provision under which to grant Miller citizenship. See id. at 1463-64 (Breyer J.,
dissenting). In particular, the Justice argued that the statute's explicit severability
provision forces the conclusion that § 1401(g) remains valid following any invalidation of § 1409(a). See id. at 1464 (Breyer,J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
I See id. at 1458-63 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
145 See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1460 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The
Court has applied a
deferential standard of review in cases involving aliens, not in cases in which only
citizens' rights were at issue."). As for the rights of those who have become citizens
by transmission from a citizen-parent to its child, the Justice suggested that their
rights are superior to those who have been naturalized later in life. See id. ("[T]he
statutes that automatically transfer American citizenship from a parent to child 'atbirth' differ significantly from those that confer citizenship on those who originally
owed loyalty to a different nation."). Ironically, this turns Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S.
815, 829 (1971), on its head. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text
(discussing the lower level of protection afforded to persons naturalized outside of
the United States at birth).
1
Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1460 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
147 See id. (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)).
Justice
Breyer contended that the statutory distinctions at issue "depend for their validity
upon the generalization that mothers are significantly more likely than fathers to
care for their children, or to develop caring relationships with their children." Id. at
1461 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
148 See id. at 1462 (Breyer,J.,
dissenting).
149 See id. at 1463 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
150 See id. at 1449 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
151 See id. at 1449-55 (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
152 See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1450-53 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
The earliest statutes
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the Justice counseled "skeptical examination" of the Government's
supposed justification for the gender distinctions drawn by section
309 - the closeness of the mother-child
relationship, in contrast to
15 3
the unstable father-child bond.

The Court's failure to resolve the substantive legal question for
which it granted certiorari leaves one wondering whether or not anything useful was accomplished by the thousands of dollars that were
undoubtedly spent bringing the case all the way to the Supreme
Court."' The answer to that question turns largely on one's view of
permitting transmission of citizenship to children born overseas seemed to apply
only when the citizen-parent was the father. See id. at 1450 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(citing Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 104, amended by Act of Jan. 29, 1795, 1 Stat.
415, amended by Act of Apr. 14, 1802, 2 Stat. 155 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401,
1409 (1994))). Relying on this historical evolution,Justice Ginsburg concluded that
the earliest Congresses "intended a child born abroad to gain citizenship only when
the father was a citizen." Id. While this interpretation of the early statutes is by no
means certain, Justice Ginsburg notes that in 1855, Congress clarified the law to ensure that "citizenship would pass to children born abroad only when the father was a
United States citizen." Id. (citing Act of Feb. 10, 1855, § 2, 10 Stat. 604, amended by
Act of May 24, 1934, 48 Stat. 797 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (1994))).
Thus, the earliest immigration and naturalization statutes openly discriminated
against women. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915) (upholding a statute that deprived all American women of their citizenship upon marriage to an alien
on grounds that "[tihe identity of husband and wife is an ancient principle of our
jurisprudence."). Similar provisions did not apply to male citizens. See Miller, 118 S.
Ct. at 1452 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that, if anything, "Congress treated
wives and children of male.. . citizens or immigrants benevolently.").
Congress did change course in 1934 and permitted citizen-mothers to transmit
citizenship to their foreign-born children - irrespective of whether or not the child
was born legitimate. See id. (citing Act of May 24, 1934, § 1, 48 Stat. 797, amended by
Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1138 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409
(1994))). It was not until 1940 that Congress began disadvantaging citizen-fathers
whose children were born overseas out of wedlock. See id. at 1453 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1138, amended by Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 238-239 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409
(1994))). The more onerous burdens placed on men by that law have survived to
the present day with minor modifications. See id. at 1453-54 (Ginsburg, J., dissentSee Miller, 118 S.Ct. at 1453-54 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting). Based on the history

inq)

summarized supra note 152, Justice Ginsburg concluded that "[f]or most of our Nation's past, Congress demonstrated no high regard or respect for the mother-child
affiliation." Id. at 1454 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Even in the post-discrimination
(i.e., post-1934) era, the Justice continued, "Congress largely relied on a residence
requirement, not the sex of the child's citizen parent, to assure an abiding affiliation
with the United States." Id.
154 When one considers that five Justices in Miller
v. Albright did not believe the
sex-based distinction at issue could withstand heightened scrutiny, as well as the fact
that the votes of only four justices are needed to grant certiorari, it becomes possible
to engage in educated speculation. Perhaps the Court was poised to overrule Fiallo
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), but was unable to do so because of the splintered nature
of the judgment.
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the proper role of stare decisis in the federal courts. Does the rule of
stare decisis imply a higher duty to establish precedent in every case or merely the duty to follow established
precedent, unless there is a
55
good reason to deviate therefrom?1
The Court's own discussions of stare decisis156 tend to stress the

values served when courts dutifully follow precedent. 7 Those values
include legal predictability,5 5 equality of treatment,9 and efficiency.' °0 This suggests that while the need to follow precedent is
central to our common-law system, the need to establish precedent in
every case is not. 16' The establishment of precedent is reserved for
155 See

Colonial Trust Co. v. Flanagan, 25 A.2d 728, 729 (Pa. 1942) (arguing that,
even if a decision is poorly reasoned, it should ordinarily be adhered to unless necessary to vindicate plain and obvious principles of law or to remedy a continued injustice).
156 The author is aware of the paradox of citing
Supreme Court pronouncements
on the true meaning of stare decisis in an article that concludes that the Court has
no special duty to make such pronouncements. Any discussion by the Court of stare
decisis, however, is by definition only dicta. See BLAcK'S LAw DICrIONARY454 (6th ed.
1990) (defining dicta as "[e]xpressions in [a] court's opinion which go beyond the
facts before [the] court ..."). Thus, in discussing stare decisis, the Court is not
realy establishing new law. See id.
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) ("[N] o judicial
system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it.");
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) ("Stare decisis is the preferred course
because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of
legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual
and perceived integrity of the judicial process."); see also Otter Tail Power Co. v. Von
Bank, 8 N.W.2d 599, 607 (N.D. 1943) (explaining that stare decisis is grounded in
the theory that both security and certainty require established legal principles to be
followed - even if later found to be unsound).
158 SeeBurnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis,
J.,
dissenting) ("[I] n most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law
be settled than that it be settled right."). Commentators have noted that "[b)ecause
of the great social utility of legal certainty and stability, the Supreme Court continues to repeat Justice Brandeis's famous words ....
"MOORE ET AL., supra note 12,
§ 134.01[1] (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275, 284 (1997); Agostini v. Felton, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 2016 (1997); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 945 (1994); Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)).
159 See Flowers v. United States, 764 F.2d 759,
761 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Stare decisis
means that like facts will receive like treatment in a court of law."); Ute Indian Tribe
v. Utah, 935 F. Supp. 1473, 1509 (D.Utah 1996) ("[Stare decisis] derived from considerations of stability and equal treatment.").
160 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 ("[N]o judicial system
could do society's work if it
eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it."); see also Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 599 (1987) (stating that stare decisis relieves judges of the
necessity of examining every situation anew).
161See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 678 (1898) ("Our duty is
to execute the law, not to make it.") (emphasis added). But see Louise Weinberg,
Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 805 (1989) (arguing that "there are no
fundamental constraints on the fashioning of rules of decision" and criticizing the
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situations where
interstices in legislative enactments require judicial
"gap-filling,' ' 62 or alternatively, situations where a court is forced to
63
declare a particular exercise of power unconstitutional.
The point of view that endows the federal courts with some
higher calling, in every case, to say "what the law is" is precisely what
leads to decisions like Afroyim - where five unelected judges, assuming a power that even a supermajority of the Congress lacks'6 - unilaterally changed the meaning of the Citizenship Clause." To the
contrary, in our system, which is rooted in notions of democracy and
divided power, it should not disappoint when splintered judgments
such as the one announced in Miller v. Albright fail to develop the
substantive law.
Richard G. Wood

view that there should be a presumption against such judicial rule-making). Leading authorities have argued that "Professor Weinberg's very broad view finds little
support in the case law .... RdcHARD
c"
H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 756 (4th ed. 1996) (citing Wallis v. Pan

American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
162See, e.g., D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S.
447, 470 (1942) (Jackson,
J., concurring) ("Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would be
impotent. This follows from the recognized futility of attempting all-complete statuto 7 codes.
63 SeeMarburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803).
1
See U.S. CONST. art. V (mandating that amendments to the Constitution
must
be "ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof.. .").
15 See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying
text.

